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CONTROLLING INTERESTS-DISCOUNT
FOR LACK OF MARKETABILITY: PART 2
By Ronald D. DiM attia, CPA, ABV, CMA
My prior article (CPA Expert, Sum
mer 2008) analyzed the concept of
a discount for lack of marketability1
for controlling ownership interests
in privately held com panies. The
article analyzed the conceptual basis
for such a discount and identified
a possible source of empirical data,
known as m erger arbitrage trans
actions. As noted in the prior arti
cle, m erger arbitrage transactions
appear to have useful characteristics
in assessing the discount for lack of
marketability for controlling owner
ship interests.
In this article, I start with a brief
overview of valuation theory as it
relates to discounts for lack of mar
ketability for co n tro llin g ow ner
ship interests. Then I analyze two
key argum ents against a discount
for lack of m arketability for con
trolling ownership interests: Con
trol owners can ( l ) “put the stock
in play” (begin the sale process) at
their discretion and sell their own
ership position and (2) can dictate
the am ount and timing of distribu
tions to shareholders, and have the
full benefit of cash flows until they
sell their ownership position.2Analy
sis of both argum ents finds them
to be lacking in certain respects.

As a result, it appears that a con
trolling ownership interest in a pri
vately held company is most prop
erly viewed as nonm arketable, and
a discount for lack of m arketabil
ity should be considered in valuing
such an interest.

CONTROLLING OWNERSHIP INTERESTS
AND VALUATION THEORY
As described in my p rio r article,
some controversy su rro u n d s the
idea that a controlling ownership
interest is most properly viewed as
nonm arketable (or illiquid). The
most authoritative argument against
the view that controlling interests
are nonm arketable is found in the
following statements:
...The conceptual math for each enter
prise level indicates that value is a
function of expected cash flow, risk,
and expected growth. I f an appraiser
adequately measures expected cash
flow and the risks and growth of those
cash flows, the result is an enterprise
value.
The argument against the existence of
a marketability discount applicable to
controlling interests is simple. I f the
enterprise value is determined based

1 It is becoming more common for valuation analysts to distinguish between marketability and liquidity when
analyzing the valuation result for a privately held company. This article, however, will continue with the more
generalized use of the term lack of marketability, which would include the effect of illiquidity.
2 A third argument against a discount for lack of marketability for controlling interests could be the control
owner’s ability to cause the company to file for an initial public offering (IPO). Because an IPO is a remote
possibility, at best, for most privately held companies, the argument is not analyzed in this article. For more
information about the IPO argument, see “The Failed IPO Study: Insight Into the DLOM” by Gregg S. Gaffen,
CFA, ASA, of Willamette Management Associates in the February/March 2005 issue of Focus, a newsletter of the
AICPA Forensic & Valuation Services Section (Vol. 1, No. 2).
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on expected cash flo ws, expected
growth of those cash flows, and the
riskiness of those cash flows, then
what additional factors would sup
port a discount from this value? The
Integrated Theory suggests there are
none.3
The stock market (in its collec
tive wisdom) does the same thing
in establishing prices for particu
lar stocks. And for that m om ent
when the stock price is evident, the
risk /re tu rn characteristics of the
stock are properly captured in its
price (barring any unusual specu
lative influence). That is because
valuation is a point estim ate—an
estimate at a given time. Addition
ally, valuation reflects foreseeable
expectations of fu tu re events—
both within and outside the sub
ject company. Changes in price are
inevitable over a period of time,
because even foreseeable events do
not occur exactly as expected.4 As
time goes on, the stock market con
tinually re-evaluates the company,
its expected cash flows, risk and
expected growth of cash flows, and
how these relate to the stock price.
M inute-by-minute fluctuations in
the stock market reflect these facts.
Therefore, any estimate of value
on any given day is subject to risk
because e x p e cta tio n s of fu tu re
events underlying the valuation
estimate may not be realized. The

difficulty arises w hen a price is
accepted and then a lengthy period
of time m ust elapse before that
price can be realized in cash. When
the time frame to actually realize
the quoted value covers a lengthy
period, it is reasonable to assume
that the potential for significant
fluctuations in stock price is mean
ingful.
T he g re a te r difficulty is th at
unforeseen events can occur which
would cause the m arket to take a
com pletely d ifferent view of the
company, its expected cash flows,
risk and expected growth of cash
flows, and how these relate to the
stock price. Lack of precision in
in te rp re tin g fo reseeab le events
com bined with the potential for
unforeseen events cause investors
great concern because significant
changes in a stock’s valuation can
result.
As a result, in order for a con
trolling ownership interest to be
viewed as marketable, some impor
tant conditions must be met. First,
there m ust be some certainty in
actually receiving the quoted value
in a timely fashion. Second, in an
environm ent in which receipt of
the quoted value is not timely and
a stock price (or q u o ted value)
has am ple time and potential to
vary widely, shareholder distribu
tions must be sufficient to do three
things prior to consummating the

actual sale:
1. During the period prior to the
sale being consummated, distri
butions must provide an implicit
m ark et-b ased r e tu rn on the
quoted value.
2. If the stock declines p rio r to
the sale being consum m ated,
distributions m ust provide an
implicit market-based return on
the quoted value long enough
for the stock to reb o u n d and
then be liquidated at the quoted
value.
3. If the stock does not rebound
prior to the sale being consum
mated, distributions must com
p en sate sh areh o ld ers for the
difference betw een the actual
closing price and the q u oted
value.
These conditions relate to the
two key arguments cited earlier that
are often advanced to support the
position that controlling ownership
interests are marketable. The argu
ments are analyzed in the following
paragraphs.

SALE OF STOCK
It is widely assumed that a control
ling ow ner can pu t the stock in
play, presumably at their discretion,
and liquidate their ownership posi
tion. But the ability to put a stock
in play does not immediately result
in cash and is not always successful.

3 Z. Christopher Mercer and Travis W. Harms, Business Valuation: An Integrated Theory, Second Edition (NewJersey: John Wiley and Sons), pp. 94-95.
4 A common element in the Statement of Assumptions and Limiting Conditions in many valuation reports is the following: “We do not provide assurance on the achiev
ability of the results forecasted by [ABC Company] because events and circumstances frequently do not occur as expected; differences between actual and expected
results may be material; and achievement of the forecasted results is dependent on actions, plans, and assumptions of management.” Statement on Standards for Valua
tion Services No. 1, issued by the AICPA Consulting Services Executive Committee, June 2007, page 37, number 4.
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As dem onstrated in my prior arti
cle, the time to complete a transac
tion can be lengthy and the risk of
failure is meaningful even for the
most marketable entities in Amer
ica—publicly traded companies.5
Empirical data show that from
the a n n o u n c em e n t of a transac
tion to acquire a publicly traded
company until its closing, the time
period averages three m onths or
m o re .6A necdotal evidence in d i
cates that the sale of a privately
h e ld com pany re q u ire s 9 to l2
m o n th s.7 These periods of tim e
are not inconsequential because
during the period any num ber of
events could occur; one being the
failure of the transaction.
Empirical data also show that the
failure rate of announced acqui
sitions of publicly traded com pa
nies is roughly 20%, and anecdotal
evidence indicates that the failure
rate is as high as 80% in the sale of
privately held companies.8 In times
of economic upheaval (as we find
ourselves in currently), a lengthy
p erio d betw een a n n o u n c e m e n t
and closing of a transaction height
ens the potential for deal failures.
For example, several high-profile
transactions en d ed in litigation
because the buyer could not justify
a price, which subsequent events
demonstrated was too high.9
Even a cursory review of stock
charts shows that any given stock’s
price can vary widely over a very
short time period—even over just
a few days’ time. As the length of
tim e grows, the op p o rtu n ity for
variation becom es greater. Cer
tainly, stocks can and do go up in
price and investors reap the ben
efit. But because investors are
risk averse, they are principally
concerned with the risk that the
stock price (or quoted value) will
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decline. Unfortunately, the current
m arket environm ent amply dem 
onstrates that stocks can experi
ence severe declines. Many publicly
tra d e d com panies have e x p e ri
enced share price declines of 50%
or m ore d u rin g a two to th re e
month period.
So even though a control owner
can begin a sale process, it is not
likely that they will receive the pro
ceeds in a timely fashion. Further
more, it is not a certainty that they
will realize the quoted value of the
stock—the price could be lower,
or the deal could fail outright. As a
result, an owner’s ability to begin a
sale process is not sufficient alone
to characterize a controlling owner
ship interest as marketable.

SHAREHOLDER DISTRIBUTIONS
A c o n tro llin g o w n er’s ability to
dictate distributions is the corner
stone of the argum ent that con
trolling ownership interests should
be c o n sid e red m ark etab le. But
events of the last 18 m onths clearly
indicate that the ability to control
distributions is not free from risk.
A lthough extrem e, these events
are instructive of the types of con
cerns investors have. A n u m b er
of large and well-known com pa
nies stopped paying dividends, or
red u ced them dram atically.10 As
recent events have shown, even if a
controlling owner desired to make
distributions he or she could be
precluded from the decision for
a variety of reasons including the
following:
• Financial m arkets could shift,
causing the firm to retain sub
stantially all of its free cash flow
to correct its financial position
(as h a p p e n ed recently in the
banking sector).
• It is im portant to note that

the idea of a “credit crunch”
is not unique. The U.S econ
omy went through a m ilder
c re d it cru n ch in the early
1990s.
• U nexpected operational issues
could develop, re q u irin g the
company to conserve cash for an
extended period (such as a labor
strike, several of which occurred
in 2006/2007).
It is not a certainty that a con
trolling owner will always have a
certain am ount of cash to distrib
ute. Often there are periods when
the need to m aintain operations
will take precedence over the con
trolling owner’s desire to distribute
cash. These periods can be quite
long. Smaller privately held compa
nies seem to be much more suscep
tible to variations in distributable
cash flow because of inferior access
to capital markets and less diverse
operations. From a valuation per
spective this is critical, because
without the certainty of receiving
cash on a regular basis investors are
subjected to additional risk from
which they seek protection.
The close link betw een value
and cash flow is also problem atic
for supporting the idea that con
tro lling ow nership interests are
m arketable. W hen a com pany’s
stock price falls from the quoted
value prior to being sold, the rea
son is often that expectations of
future cash flows have been com
prom ised in some respect. Cer
tainly macroeconomic or deal-spe
cific issues could have an effect,
but even these would often have
some impact on expectations of the
company’s future cash flows. In an
environment of a lower share price
and potentially compromised cash
flows, is it reasonable to assume

5 Ronald D. DiMattia, “Controlling Interests — Discount for Lack of Marketability: The Empirical Evidence,” CPA Expert, Summer 2008, pp. 1-6.
6 DiMattia, p. 4.
7 DiMattia, p. 3.
8 DiMattia, pp. 3-5.
9 Examples include the Dow Chemical/Rohm & Haas transaction (which litigation settled as this article was being written) and the Huntsman/Hexion transaction.
10 Examples include Alcoa, Capital One, CBS Corp., Cedar Fair, Wells Fargo, US Bancorp, PNC, J.P. Morgan Chase and General Electric, among others.
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that the control owner can create a
market-based return on the quoted
value until the stock rebounds? Is it
reasonable to assume that the con
trol owner could distribute enough
cash to make up for the difference
in valuation if the stock does not
rebound? Perhaps, on both counts,
but it would depend on how far the
stock has fallen, how deeply the
cash flows have been compromised,
how likely the price is to rebound,
and the time frame of the hopedfor rebound. Given a large enough
correction in the stock price or dis
tributable cash flows, one is hard
pressed to imagine a scenario that
could work.
Practical concerns also present
problem s for the argum ent that
a control owner can dictate the
amount and timing of distributions
prior to a sale being consummated.
Generally, controlling ownership
interests are sold pursuant to the
terms of a letter of intent; the terms
are form alized and finalized in a
purchase agreement. Most terms of
a letter of intent are nonbinding,
but the letter does set forth each
party’s expectations about basic ele
ments of the final purchase agree
m ent, the conduct of the parties
prior to closing, and the ability of
either party to term inate negotia
tions. Many of these agreements set
forth an expectation that the owner
will not distribute cash outside the
normal course of business prior to
the transaction closing. Addition
ally, purchase agreem ents often
contain a form al rep resen tatio n
that the seller has not m ade any
distributions outside the norm al
course of business in the period
prior to the transaction closing.
Interim cash flows that a control
owner can direct to shareholders
would certainly be a risk or con
tingency th at a valuation analyst
m ust consider in assessing a dis
c o u n t for lack of m arketability.
But the opportunity for it is not
so complete and determinative as

4

to negate the consideration of a
discount for lack of marketability.
Practical matters, risks and contin
gencies associated with future cash
flows as a support for marketability
are too great to ignore.

CONCLUSION
This article d e m o n stra tes that,
from both a theoretical and practi
cal standpoint, controlling owner
ship interests in privately held com
panies are most properly viewed as
nonm arketable. Given that selling
a controlling ow nership interest
is not an immediate event, risk in
actually realizing the quoted valua
tion is substantial. Investors are not
capable of perfect foresight, and as
time progresses one would expect
investors to re-evaluate the basis
of their valuation. More troubling
is the em ergence of unforeseen
events, which can have a signifi
cant impact on an investors’ valua
tion. Therefore, the argument that
controlling interests are marketable
relies on the owner’s ability to 1)
put the stock in play and 2) direct
distributions to shareholders.
However, an ow ner’s ability to
put the stock in play is not suffi
cient to characterize a controlling
ownership interest as marketable.
Empirical evidence indicates that
the time to realize the quoted value
in cash is lengthy and the risk of
deal failure is m eaningful. Stock
m arket data also indicate that the
potential for a significant fall-off in
valuation during the period prior
to a tran sactio n being consum 
mated is meaningful.
Similarly, an owners’ ability to
direct distributions to shareholders
is not sufficient to characterize a
controlling ownership interest as
marketable. It is not a certainty that a
controlling owner will have sufficient
cash available to make distributions
to shareholders. Additionally, from
a practical perspective a control
owner’s ability to make distributions
often is severely restricted during the

period prior to a transaction being
consummated.
Because investors are risk averse,
they are concerned with the poten
tial for a price decline from the
point of the quoted value to the
p o in t it is realized as cash. O ur
attem pt, then, is to m easure how
m uch protection an investor will
require to accept a point estimate
of value, knowing that it will not be
realized until a meaningful period
of tim e has elapsed. O ffsetting
this risk would be the interim cash
flows that can be distributed. Even
so, m eaningful risks exist for the
controlling owner, and it is logical
to expect that a rational investor
would seek protection from such
risks. The expected form of such
protection would be a discount to
reflect the relative lack of market
ability.
To be sure, m arketability is a
concept that is heavily influenced
by the valuation analyst’s judgment.
A guidepost, then, would be useful
to help form the analyst’s ju d g 
ment. The previous article in CPA
Expert, Sum m er 2008, in dicated
th at studies of m erger arbitrage
could be a good indicator of the
lack of marketability of a control
ling ownership interest. The spread
in these transactions reflects arbi
trageurs’ estimates of the risk that
expectations of future events will
not occur as planned in the period
p rio r to closing. A lthough m ore
research is needed, it would appear
that studies of m erger arbitrage
could be a useful guidepost. X

Ronald D. D iM a ttia , CPA, ABV, CM A, is
president of Corporate Value P artners,
Inc. in Rocky River, Ohio, (4 4 0 ) 3 3 3 -1 9 1 0 .
His firm specializes in providing corporate
finance consulting services to small and
midsized businesses.
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OPINION

IN REMARRIAGE OF THORNHILL: EMERGING ISSUES IN
STANDARD OF VALUE DETERMINATIONS FOR FAMILY LAW
MATTERS
By Brenda M. Clarke, CPA/ABV/CFF, CVA, and Ronald L. Seigneur, MBA, CPA/ABV/CFF, CVA
Many business analysts focus a sub
stantial portion of their practice
on family law m atters, including
the valuation of ownership inter
ests in closely held businesses and
professional practices. As in most
valuation engagements, the initial
threshold questions to be resolved
before p roceeding to develop a
work plan, inclusive of a request for
the required information, include
the determination of the appropri
ate standard of value, the premise
of value, and the date of value to
use for the underlying analysis and
opinion.
Most analysts are accustomed to
having their client or client’s legal
counsel provide these three funda
mental elements. As we know, with
out employing the proper standard
of value, one cannot expect to get
the right answer to the valuation con
clusion being sought. To complicate
this matter, the proper standard of
value for family law matters varies in
different jurisdictions. Some states
define the proper standard of value
by statute, such as Arkansas1and Lou
isiana,12 whereas other states rely on
prior litigated precedents, such as
Newjersey3and California.45
Recently, a family law valuation
matter in Colorado received signifi
cant attention because of its rela
tionship to the standard of value

question. In the case In re Marriage
of [Chuck and Antoinette] Thornhill,5
the trial court allowed for a 33% dis
count for lack of marketability, using
a Fair Market Value standard, on a
70.5% controlling interest in an oil
and gas business located on the west
ern slope of Colorado. The applica
tion of a Fair Market Value (FMV)
standard was appealed to the Colo
rado Court of Appeals, which ruled
that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rendering its decision.
The appellate decision has recently
been granted a Writ of Certiorari
before the Colorado Supreme Court
(the Court) on two distinct and sepa
rate issues.
The first issue to be considered
by the Court relates to the basis of
the trial court’s award of a temporary
maintenance award and is beyond
the scope of this article. The sec
ond issue is whether the trial court
erred in not considering the find
ings in Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe,
7wc.6(Pueblo/Lindoe),7 which effec
tively established the guidelines for
application of the Fair Value stan
dard in Colorado cases involving dis
senting and oppressed shareholders.
The Court ruled in the Pueblo/Lindoe m atter that Fair Value in Col
orado is equivalent to Fair Market
Value without the application of a
discount for lack of marketability. It

is widely accepted in Colorado that
this is now the appropriate standard
for these types of litigated proceed
ings, but, heretofore, there has not
been any consensus about whether
the Fair Value standard, as defined in
Pueblo/Lindoe, is appropriate in the
determinations of value for equitable
distribution in family law matters.
In its ruling, the appellate court
stated the following:
We conclude the considerations
that underlie the Pueblo Bancorpo
ration decision are inapplicable
in a dissolution proceeding for
several reasons. The dissolution
statutes do not contain the ‘fair
value’ language of section 7-113101(4) that was critical to the
court’s analysis. Its com prehen
sive review of similar statutes in
other jurisdictions led to its con
clusion that ‘fair value’ does not
mean ‘fair market value,’ and, as
a result, the common practice of
including a marketability discount
in calculating fair market value is
not permitted in dissenting share
holder valuations.
The court went on to say the fol
lowing:
We are instead persuaded by the
decisions of num erous o th e r
jurisdictions that have concluded

1 Arkansas Code §9-12-315.(4).
2 Louisiana Code §9-2801-(l) (a); 9:2801.2.
3 Brown v. Brown 348 N.J. Superior Ct. 466; 792 A.2d 463.
4 Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 Cal.App.Dist.2; March 5, 1969.
5 In re Marriage of Thornhill, 2008 WL 3877223 (Colo. App.) (Aug. 21, 2008).
6 Ibid.
7 Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., P.3d 353 (Colo. 2003).
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marketability discounts may be
applied in valuing shares in closely
held corporations in dissolution
proceedings. Such a discount
would be applied to reflect the
fact that shares of stock in such
corporations are less marketable
than publicly traded stock, a fac
tor that an ordinary buyer would
take into consideration in decid
ing what to pay for the shares.
The cross petition for Writ of Cer
tiorari was granted in mid-February
2009 to hear the issue of whether
the appellate court erred by refusing
to extend the holding of Pueblo/
L indoe to divorce proceedings,
thereby allowing the application of
a marketability discount in valuing
a closely held corporation operated
as a going concern at the time of the
parties’ dissolution of marriage pro
ceeding.
The trial court relied on testi
mony submitted by separate experts
retained by both the petitioner and
respondent. Apparently the court
found more compelling the evidence
and testimony of the p etitio n er’s
expert, who had utilized a Fair Mar
ket Value standard and applied the
33% lack of marketability discount
to Mr. Thornhill’s 70.5% ownership
interest in his oil and gas business.89
A couple of factors identified by the
appellate court are also worth not
ing. The wife was not represented
by legal counsel when the parties
entered into a separation agreement
providing for maintenance and divid
ing the marital estate. At the time
of the scheduled trial court hear
ing to enter into a final decree, the
wife realized that she did not have
a good understanding of the value
of the marital assets and, therefore,
disavowed the original separation

agreem ent as being unfair to her.
It is interesting to note that she was
assisted in negotiating the separa
tion agreement by her father, who
happened to be the CFO of the
husband’s business at the time. The
appellate court noted that purely
by virtue of his role as CFO of the
husband’s business, the father was
required to attempt the preservation
of the business assets, which resulted
in dual loyalties.
The appellate court concluded
that the considerations that underlie
the Pueblo/Lindoe decision are not
applicable in a dissolution proceeding
for “several reasons,” including that
the state statutes do not contain the
“fair value” language that was critical
in the Pueblo/Lindoe decision. The
same court also declined to adopt the
holding of the New Jersey landmark
case Brown v. Brown9 in which the
New Jersey appellate court extended
the reasoning of cases under New
Jersey dissenting shareholder statutes
to hold that marketability discounts
are not appropriate in dissolution
proceedings. Instead, the appellate
court stated that trial courts in
dissolution cases act as courts of
equity and should have discretion
w h eth er to apply m arketability
d is c o u n ts in v a lu in g closely
held corporations in dissolution
proceedings, while stating that the
court expressed no opinion about the
amount or percentage of the discount
that may be applied. It continued by
stating that trial courts should make
a clear record about the reason for
applying a given discount rate to
facilitate review on appeal.
The finding and application of
valuation theory and concepts in
this matter raises the following key
issues that are worthy of note by val
uation analysts:

1. What is the proper standard of
value in family law matters in Col
orado?
2. How is a 33% lack of m arket
ability discount justified on what
appears to be a 70.5% controlling
interest?
3. W hen the facts indicate th at
there is an identified “buyer” in
the instance of family law matters,
based on prior appellate prece
dents in the subject jurisdiction,
can the Fair Market Value or Fair
Value standards be used, given
the commonly accepted defini
tions of each of these standards?
4. If the subject ownership inter
est was not controlling, would
the trial court have allowed a
discount for lack of control or
minority interest?
Many states, such as A rizona,101
C alifornia11 and Kentucky12, have
recognized precedents that reflect
the concept commonly referred to
as value to the holder under an invest
ment value premise, which is some
times referred to as the value the
propertied spouse would be will
ing to pay into the marital estate to
retain the benefits of their owner
ship interest in a business or profes
sional practice. This concept relies
on the notion of an identified seller
(the propertied spouse) and, there
fore, runs contrary to the require
ment for a hypothetical willing buyer
under Fair Market Value.13
In other words, the assumed seller
used in the Value to the H older
premise is the owner of the interest,
and this moves the focus to Invest
ment Value in terms of what this spe
cific buyer is willing to pay into the
marital estate to retain the rights and
benefits of the interest. With this in
mind, we can envision a spectrum of

8 It is important to note that all family law cases are sealed at the Colorado Court of Appeals and therefore it is not possible to review any of the pleadings or findings.
9 792 A.2d 463 (N.J. SupCT. App. Div. 2002).
10 Mitchellv. Mitchell 152 Ariz. 317 732 P. 2d 208 (1987).
11 See footnote no. 4.
12 Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W. 2d 56 1990 Ky. App. Lexis 3 (Ky. CT. App. 1990).
13 Defined in the current edition of the International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms as “the price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which property would
change hands between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller, acting at arm ’s length in an open and unrestricted market, when
neither is under compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.”
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the premise of value ranging from
what the Fair Market Value would
be between a willing buyer and will
ing seller in an assumed exchange
to what the Investment Value would
be to the specific holder of the inter
est. In most appraisal settings, dis
counts for lack of marketability and
lack of control are explicitly relevant
in an assumed exchange transaction,
whereas similar discounts would not
necessarily be relevant or appropri
ate for the value proposition to a spe
cific identified holder of the owner
ship interest when an imminent sale
or an assumed exchange between a
buyer and seller is not expected to
occur.
C onsistent with this range of
value premise, we believe Colorado
has followed an Investment Value
and Value to the Holder approach,
based on the findings in In re Mar
riage of Grafff In re Marriage of Mar
tin15 and In re the Marriage of Huff.16
In all of these decisions, the court
makes specific reference to the value
being what the propertied spouse
would pay for the ownership inter
est in question, as opposed to what a
hypothetical buyer would be willing
to pay. The propertied spouse obvi
ously brings an entirely different ori
entation to the table because he or
she would typically have motivations
and reasons why he or she would pay
a higher value into the marital estate
to retain the rights and entitlements
of the ownership interest in ques
tion. In an Investment Value and
Value to the Holder premise, there is
typically little rationale for a discount
for lack of marketability of any mag
nitude.
For example, in the Huff case, the
appellate court noted that the valu
ation method used was appropriate
because it provided the best indica
tion of the value of the husband’s
interest in his law practice p art
nership to himself, as opposed to
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another willing buyer or seller. The
appellate decision also noted that
an individual practitioner’s inability
to sell his or her interest in the prac
tice does not eliminate the existence
of goodwill and its value as an asset
to be considered in equitable distri
bution, and such equitable distribu
tion does not require conveyance
or transfer of any particular asset.
Similarly, in the M artin case, the
appellate court noted that the value
of goodwill is not necessarily depen
d en t upon what a willing buyer
would pay for such goodwill, stat
ing that the important consideration
is whether the business interest has
value to the propertied spouse above
and beyond the tangible assets. In
the Graff case, the appellate court
noted the value of the subject’s State
Farm insurance agency ownership
interest should be based on what
the agency was worth to the owner,
notwithstanding specific restrictions
on the transfer of the insurance
agency by State Farm. The Graff
decision also specifically noted that
the value of goodwill is not necessar
ily dependent upon what a willing
buyer would pay for such goodwill;
rather, the important consideration
is whether the business has value to
the spouse over and above the tan
gible assets.
Notwithstanding significant Colo
rado family law precedent that pri
marily supports an Investment Value
and Value to the Holder premise, it
is clear so far that if the trial court
wants to apply an alternate Fair
Market Value standard, such as that
adopted in Thornhill, then a discount
for lack of marketability may well
apply. The key point here is that it
is routinely more of an issue with
noncontrolling interests under FMV,
versus the 70.5% ownership Mr.
Thornhill controlled in the subject
business, in which it is considered
unreasonable to take such a large

discount. Most often, controlling
interests in closely held businesses
are not discounted at all for lack of
marketability under even a Fair Mar
ket Value standard. This is due to
the fundamental fact that the con
trolling owner can indeed decide to
sell at any time, and often quite effi
ciently, notwithstanding the absence
of a public market. Unfortunately,
the m agnitude of the disco u n t
allowed in this case for a controlling
interest is not an issue that will be
heard by the Court.
If the Thornhill interest at issue
had been a 20% share of the enter
prise, many valuation analysts would
begin to be m uch m ore com fort
able with lack of marketability dis
counts approaching a 25% to 35%
range, similar to what was utilized
in Thornhill. This smaller m inor
ity interest might also require con
sideration of a discount for lack of
control or minority interest, often
of a like amount under a Fair Mar
ket Value standard. Both discounts
are very fact-specific and draw upon
numerous sources to help support
the proper levels.
Valuation analysts typically are
provided with the proper standard of
value to use in their appraisal assign
ment, along with the proper premise
of value (for example, going concern
versus liquidation) and date of value,
at the onset of their engagement.
When the trier of fact in equitable
distribution cases can determine the
proper standard of value based on
the facts and circumstances of each
case, we can expect to see wide varia
tions in the ultimate finding of value
for the subject closely held owner
ship interest in businesses and pro
fessional practices. This is because
of the m agnitude of the im pact
(for example, up to 50% or 60%)
on w hether the aforem entioned
discounts are deemed appropriate.
In some instances, the analyst will

14 In re Marriage of Graff, 902 P. 2d 402 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
15 In re Marriage of Martin, 707 P. 2d 1035 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
16 In re the Marriage of Huff, 834 P. 2d. 244.
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need to provide conclusions under
more than one standard of value to
allow the trier of fact to evaluate what
value is ultimately deem ed appro
priate in any specific case in which
the proper standard of value remains
undefined, as is the case presently in
Colorado.
An im portant point of compari
son with all of this is to evaluate how
the premise and standard of value
choices are used in other appraisal
disciplines, such as real estate, which
if done right, uses a similarly defined
fair m arket value stan d ard 17 and
draws much of its work from use of
m arket com parables. E m bedded
within the use of the market method
in real estate appraisals is an inher
17

between jurisdictions and that states
with the standard of value for disso
lu tio n of m arriage proceedings
based on court case precedent can
be expected to have an ever-evolving
landscape, such as is the case cur
rently in Colorado. X

Brenda M. Clarke, CPA/ABV, CVA, is an
associate partner and Ronald L. Seigneur,
MBA, CPA/ABV, CVA, is partner/valuation
specialist w ith Seigneur Gustafson LLP,
Lakewood, Co. Both contribute frequently
to AICPA publications. Mr. Seigneur has
chaired the AICPA ABV Credential Com
mittee and served on several other AICPA
committees including the Consulting Ser
vices Executive Committee and the Busi
ness Valuation Committee.

It should be noted that fair market value in real estate valuation has slightly different distinctions, such as time allotted for exposure to the marketplace.

INTERVIEW SAFETY
AWARENESS
By Randal A. Wolverton, CPA/CFF, CFE
Forensic accountants and o th er
accounting professionals have more
interview training opportunities than
ever before; however, interview safety
is often neglected. Are CPAs exposed
to violent encounters in their every
day practice? Probably not. Such vio
lence may be so rare that statistics on
such situations may not even exist.
However, the truth is that the poten
tial is real, and the consequences
may be dire. With a little knowledge
and planning, interviewers can avoid
exposure to potential violence.
As more fraud schemes are being
uncovered in a declining economy,
professional accountants, by virtue
of their knowledge of the books and
records as well as the operations of
an organization, understandably are
relied upon to assist with fraud inves
tigations. Fraud-related engagements
make the chances of encountering a
fraud suspect or suspects more likely,

8

ent discount for the marketability or
lack thereof of the subject property.
This often creates baseline confusion
in comparison to business appraisal
indications un d er a Value to the
H older premise in which m arket
ability discounts are not applied. For
a trier of fact, this creates an envi
ronm ent in which some assets (for
example, closely held businesses) are
not subject to reductions in value for
discounts for lack of a ready market,
while other marital assets (for exam
ple, the marital home and owned
autos) are effectively discounted.
One thing is certain in the final
analysis here. It is very clear that
there are great distinctions in what
standard of value is appropriate

but many engagements may
not start with the expectation
of discovering fraud. The fact
finding process can quickly
tu rn into a fraud m atter,
thereby changing the dynam
ics of contacts and interviews.
As always, advice of coun
sel should be sought if allegations
of fraud are discovered during an
engagement, especially if the accoun
tant has little or no experience in con
ducting a fraud investigation.
A lth o u g h v io le n c e a g a in s t
accountants may not occur often, it
has happened on occasion. The ris
ing frequency and severity of such
workplace violence not only is dis
turbing but also is getting increased
m edia attention and is becoming
the subject of more formal studies. It
also is not surprising that workplace
violence has resulted in a num ber
of injuries and fatalities across the
United States. Statistics confirm that,
on many occasions, the perpetra
tor directs the violence at whomever
he or she feels is responsible for
taunting, disciplining or dismissal.
It is worth noting that many perpe
trators resort to extreme violence

when finally overwhelmed by cir
cumstances, but the events leading
to their angst have occurred over
time. How do we know when some
people reach the breaking point?
The answer is that we don’t, but we
can recognize signs of discord that
should raise our concern in certain
interview situations.
Trained law enforcem ent offi
cers know that, although violence
is less frequent in financial crime
investigations than other types of
investigations, such encounters can
occur. Knowing that violence is less
frequent may make it very easy to be
lulled into complacency when deal
ing with white-collar crime witnesses
and suspects. Just as there is no
“routine” car stop, there also should
never be a “routine” interview when
dealing with potential fraud. Con
sider that persons committing fraud
will know whether the interviewer
asking the questions is a law enforce
m ent officer armed with weapons,
handcuffs and arrest powers. The
same suspects also will know that an
accountant is not. Therefore, recog
nition and reduction of risks become
more important.
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PREPARING FOR THE INTERVIEW
Much can be done prior to an inter
view to identify and reduce potential
risks. Professional accountants are
typically skilled in documentation,
accuracy and preparation, and they
can use the same skills to reduce risks
in the interview process. Consider
the following recommendations:
1. Employee and engagement data. If
traveling ou tsid e the office,
inform som eone at the hom e
office of the date, time and loca
tion of the interview, the partici
pants, and the expected time of
return. Also leave at the office
descriptions and license numbers
of vehicles being driven to the
engagement.
2. Telephone contact checks. Leave with
som eone at the hom e office a
contact telephone number at the
destination and a personal cell
phone num ber. Before leaving
the office, make a quick check to
determ ine if your cell phone is
operational and charged. If pos
sible, you should know whether
your cell phone has coverage at
your destination. In the event of
an emergency, a 911 operator will
want to know immediately the full
names of the persons involved;
their approximate ages, physical
descriptions, clothing descrip
tions, cell phone num bers and
vehicles and license numbers; the
full addresses of locations involved
and other pertinent data.
3.Partner interviews. Avoid situa
tions in which you are asked to
meet a person alone, particularly
if the person is not well known
to you. Having a second person
as a witness during an interview
is recommended for practical as
well as safety reasons. A coworker
as a witness also may reduce the
chances of false accusations of
misconduct.
4. Locations. If possible, conduct inter
views in business locations dur
ing normal business hours when
other persons are on the premises.
Interviews in hotel lobbies may be
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appropriate but interviews in hotel
rooms are probably not. Avoid
interviews in bars, parking lots and
private vehicles. Discourage the
use of alcohol during professional
engagements. Although interviews
in private homes can be appro
priate if the interviewee is known
and trusted, view the situation
with caution. Interviews in govern
ment buildings will offer screening
devices that provide assurance that
firearms and other weapons are
removed. Also, consider conduct
ing interviews in your home office
in a room with furniture arranged
to enhance safety as well as effec
tive communications.
Identity of persons contacted. If you
are unfam iliar with the person
being interviewed, ask for a busi
ness card. View the business card
carefully and retain it for your
records. Always ask for full names,
addresses, contact numbers and
jo b descriptions. Try to gather
this information in advance when
arranging a date and time for a
meeting.
6. Dress and demeanor. An in te r
viewer and partner should always
be app ro p riately dressed and
conduct themselves in a cour
teous and professional manner.
Avoid disclosing personal infor
mation about yourselves during
the interview.
7.Trust your instincts. A lthough
you cannot conduct a thorough
background check on the per
son being interviewed, you can
change the date and location of
an interview if you believe that
som ething is amiss. If you’re
uneasy, take control of the cir
cumstances until you reach your
desired comfort level. It is easy
to explain changes by saying that
company policy dictates the cir
cumstances of interviews.

DURING THE INTERVIEW
Once at the interview location, inter
viewers need to maintain their guard.
The following recommendations will

help interviewers to recognize and
deal with threatening situations:
1. Awareness. The vast majority of con
tacts by professional accountants
will proceed without safety prob
lems; however, our awareness and
skepticism should continuously
increase as we move closer to the
subject of fraud. Remember, many
fraudsters have been concealing a
scheme for long periods of time, so
you may be viewed as an immedi
ate threat to their plans.
2. Interview location. When you first
enter the room to be used for
an interview, take a mental note
of the layout. In the event of a
problem, do you and your partner
have an escape route? Try to avoid
a situation in which an angry per
son or other physical obstacles can
block your exit. Also, if an inter
viewee becomes angry, does he
or she have an escape route that
does not involve going through
you? You should consider having
a table or other piece of furniture
between you and the person being
interviewed. Take a mental note
of objects in the room that could
be used as weapons against you or
that you might use to protect your
self, such as telephones, objects
on desks and tables, lamps, small
chairs and so on.
3. Physical red flags. D uring an
interview, be aware of behav
ioral reactions that may indicate
stress, uneasiness, or even anger.
Increased perspiration, dryness
of the mouth or a cracking voice
can be an indication of internal
turmoil.
4. Oral redflags. If you listen carefully,
a person under stress may provide
clues to potential outbursts. Our
concern and skepticism should
intensify if the person being inter
viewed makes comments about
violence, excessive alcohol or drug
use, depression, abusive relation
ships, anger, resentment, financial
problems or threats.
5. Admissions and confessions. A person
confessing to misconduct may be
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viewing his or her world as falling
apart and see the persons in the
room as bearing some blam e
for the situation. D epression
and anger are common in these
circumstances and may influence
the th in k in g of th e p erso n
confessing to improper conduct.
Many people have expressed relief
while calmly confessing to serious
misconduct, but do not be fooled
into complacency. As an example,
a p e rso n b e in g tre a te d for
depression may have the benefit
of powerful drugs to control mood
swings. What if he or she did not
take the medication that day? Also,

MADOFF "GAMED"
THE SYSTEM

consider that if you arranged the
interview in advance, the person
may believe that he or she will be
confronted with incrim inating
in fo rm a tio n , th ereb y raising
his or her anxiety level. As the
interviewer, you will most likely not
know this prior to your arrival.
6. Worst-case scenario. Preparing in
advance for potential dangers
may be the difference between a
positive resolution of a bad situ
ation or something much worse.
In an emergency, can you pro
tect yourself? If necessary, can you
escape an enclosed location, put
distance between you and danger

stock exchange on which
Madoff served as chairman of
the board from 1990 to 1993.
In effect, Madoff helped shape
the rules for private brokerAnnette M. Stalker, CPA/CFF, CFE, and Michael G. dealers, which were enforced
Ueltzen, CPA/CFF, CFE
by the NASD1 and the Securi
ties and Exchange Commis
Through a combination of leader
sion (SEC). Many of Madoff's
ship in regulatory organizations, the
close relatives held positions in sev
opaque nature of his operations and
eral financial sector agencies, includ
his seemingly philanthropic endeav
ing the Financial Industry Regulatory
ors, Bernard Madoff was uniquely
Authority’s (FINRA’s) compliance
board, the NASD, the National Adju
positioned to exploit regulatory
dicatory Council (mutual fund task
gaps for personal gain.
force)
and the Securities Industry and
For m ore th an 30 years, the
Financial
Markets Association (secu
unparalleled Ponzi scheme Madoff
rities
firm
trade association). Many
conducted escaped detection. Many
wonder “How could this happen?”
financial services regulators and lead
ers looked to Madoff for input and
and “Where were the regulators?”
Yes, Madoff operated in a highly
guidance on the rules.
regulated environm ent, but there
On a perso n al level, M adoff
is a fine line between reasonable,
appeared to be a generous bene
factor of the Jewish community. He
effective regulation and burdensome
rules that eliminate the small brokergained their instant trust, based on
his apparent contributions, upstand
dealers and investment advisers, as
well as professionals providing ser
ing character and financial acumen.
In the world of Ponzi schemes, a
vices to them.
Early in his career, M adoff
fraudster can gain access to later
became involved with the launch of
victims through this type of “affinity
the National Association of Securi
group.”
ties Dealers (NASD), a self-regulatory
In this case, it is particularly trou
agency for broker-dealer firms. The
bling that Madoff preyed on many
charitable foundations and pensionNASD later created the NASDAQ

and relay accurate information to
authorities?
Many of the preceding recom 
mendations may seem obvious and
intuitive; however, an emergency sit
uation is not the time to be plan
ning your actions. X

Randal A. Wolverton, CPA/CFF, CFE, is a
retired FBI Supervisory Special Agent. He
currently participates in mortgage fraud and
asset forfeiture investigations as a contrac
tor for the FBI. He also serves on the AICPA
Forensic & Litigation Services Committee.
He can be contacted at randal.wolverton@
ic.fbi.gov.

ers. These organizations and indi
viduals depended completely on the
promises of a fraudster who lied,
cheated and stole for decades.
Even with such a cunning and
convincing fraudster, many wonder
“Shouldn’t there have been checks
and balances in place to ensure one
person could not wreak so much
damage?”

WHAT WAS THE REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT?
Broker-Dealer Oversight
The SEC regulates the activities of
securities broker-dealers under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act). FINRA, a self-regu
latory organization funded through
broker-dealer participant fees, was
form ed in 2007 by combining the
NASD with the New York Stock
E xchange’s m em ber regulation,
enforcem ent and arbitration func
tions. FINRA provides education,
conducts examinations and writes
and enforces rules for registered
broker-dealers but not for invest
m ent advisers. Madoff was instru
m ental in developing the govern
ing rules through his role on the
boards of the NASD, the NASDAQ
and other agencies.

1 In 2007, the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange’s member regulation, enforcement and arbitration division merged and
became the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
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Investment Advisory Oversight
The activities of investment advisers
are governed by the Investment Advis
ers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act), and the
activities of investment companies are
governed by the Investment Company
Act of 1940. The SEC, not FINRA, is
the sole agency authorized to enforce
the Advisers Act.
Bernard L. Madoff Investm ent
Securities LLC (BLMIS) was unique
in that M adoff was both a regis
tered investment adviser and a bro
ker-dealer. The full extent of assets
under management was never visible
to any one regulatory body because
of his extensive use of “funds of
funds.” Also, because he did not
charge fees for asset m anage
m ent but only for trade exe
cution, no revenue would
have been reported as asset
management fees. Madoff
Charitable
avoided registering with
the SEC as an investment Foundations
adviser until 2006, follow
ing an SEC investigation related to
his investment advisory business.2
Madoff was able to deflect SEC and
FINRA regulatory oversight because of
his knowledge of the overlapping duties
and responsibilities of the two organi
zations. Madoff gamed the system.
Many of the various funds (both
direct and in d ire ct investors to
Madoff) that were invested wholly or
partially in Madoff had an investment
adviser. They were typically respon
sible for determining and placing the
funds’ monies into investment vehi
cles and ensuring that the nature of
investments were in line with the fund
agreement and placement memoran
dum criteria. These advisers were reg
istered with the SEC.
Madoff deflected SEC oversight by using
other organizations that were required to
be registered with the SEC as investment
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advisers to serve as the intermediary
for investments in the Madoff funds.
Madoffgamed the system.

Madoff Pyramid
Madoff, "shadow" Investment Adviser

4 ,8 0 0
"Customers"

ever, only the statement of financial
condition is publicly available.
Madoff was careful to select a CPA
firm not registered with the PCAOB
and not subject to professional peer
review. Madoffgamed the system.

WAS MADOFF ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF THE REGULATORY EXCEPTIONS?

The following regulatory exceptions
were in place for private securities
firms, such as BLMIS:
• Custody rule exception. An amend
Layers and Layers of
ment to the Advisers Act through
Hedge Funds
Rule 206(4)-2 became effective
Known as Funds of Funds
November 5, 2003, and provided
(FOFs)
that certain registered investment
advisers who use a qualified cus
todian (for example, a registered
broker-dealer) to maintain client
assets were no longer required
U n k n o w n N u m b e r o f End C u s to m e rs
to submit to annual surprise
audits by an in d e p e n d e n t
Individuals
Universities
Pensioners
Retirees
public accountant as long as
the c u sto d ia n sends p e ri
odic account statements to the
Independent Accountant Oversight
adviser’s clients at least quarterly.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 cre
BLMIS was both an investment
ated the Public Company Account
adviser and qualified custodian
ing O versight Board (PCAOB),
via the registered broker-dealer
which was designed to oversee the
status pursuant to Section 15(b)
auditors of public companies. An
(1) of the Exchange Act. Despite
accounting firm registered with the
the exception to the custody rules
PCAOB is subject to the standards
for investment advisers, the SEC
set by the PCAOB, as well as over
complaint against David Friehling
sight and enforcement.
of the Friehling and Horowitz
Audits of entities that are required
CPA firm indicates that internal
to file financial statements under
control reports for BLMIS were
Section 17(e) of the Exchange Act
filed annually. Based on other
must be performed by independent
m edia reports, it appears that
accounting firms registered with the
Frank DiPascali, referred to as a
PCAOB. Beginning in August 2003,
key lieutenant of the Madoff firm,
the SEC issued a series of orders
may have sent audit reports and
granting nonpublic broker-dealers
internal control reports prepared
temporary exemptions from the obli
by Friehling and Horowitz and
gation of filing financial statements
other account statements to cli
audited by registered public account
ents, other independent accoun
ing firms. Madoff filed an Annual
tants or both.
Form X-17A-5. The face sheet of the
Accountant registration exception.
form indicates several financial state
Section 17 (a) of the Exchange
ments and reports are included; how-

2 To put the magnitude of oversight into perspective, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) currently has oversight of more than 5,000 reporting companies;
5,500 broker-dealers; 11,000 investment advisers and, in conjunction with FINRA, in excess of 600,000 registered representatives. In the most recent year, the SEC con
ducted examinations of 1,500 investment advisers and, in conjunction with FINRA, in excess of 55% of the registered broker-dealers.
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Act requires registered brokerdealers to provide certain “certi
fied financial information" to the
SEC and customers; Section 17(e)
was amended in 2002 by the Sar
banes Oxley Act to require that
the financial information of the
issuer be certified by a “registered
public accounting firm ” of the
PCAOB. This requirem ent had
been continually deferred by the
SEC through a series of releases
through fiscal years ending before
January 1, 2009.
Selecting the Friehling and Horow
itz CPA firm was a deliberate act to
avoid PCAOB and professional peer
review oversight. Madoff gamed the
system.

Private hedge funds are not cur
rently required to be registered with
the SEC; however, approxim ately
20% of all fund firms have regis
tered with the agency since 2006.
Madoff's use of the “split strike con
version” 3 hedge provided him the
cover of a seemingly plausible invest
ment strategy.
B ecause re g is tra tio n is n o t
required, the SEC does not have pur
view over the m agnitude of funds
involved and, therefore, at risk.
Once again, Madoff carefully selected
investment vehicles that were not sub
ject to extensive oversight by the SEC or
others. Madoffgamed the system.

In ad d itio n to en gaging an
accounting firm not registered with
the PCAOB and dealing with hedge
funds, Madoff avoided in-depth over
sight by the SEC and FINRA because
of the lack of a coordinated oversight
program of broker-dealers and invest
m ent advisers. Evidence also exists
that Madoff lied to the regulators and
apparently contacted some of his inves
tors in advance of SEC investigations.
Madoff gamed the system to the
great detriment of thousands. X
Annette Stalker, CPA/CFF, CFE, is director
and M ichael G. Ueltzen, CPA/CFF, CFE, is
partner in the forensic accounting practice
of Ueltzen and Company, Sacramento. Mr.
Ueltzen chairs the AICPA Certified in Finan
cial Forensics (CFF) credential committee.
He can be contacted via em ail a t muelt
zen@ueltzen. com.

Madoff's purported split strike conversion strategy involved the purchase of indexed stocks and the use of put and call options at predefined prices to establish a ceiling
and floor. Madoff would sell “out of the money” and into government-backed securities according to proprietary market indicators.
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